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Abstract
Ark is an implementation of a consensus algorithm
similar to Paxos[7] and Raft[11], designed as an im-
provement over the existing consensus algorithm used
by MongoDB R© and TokuMXTM.
Ark was designed from first principles, improving
on the election algorithm used by TokuMX, to fix
deficiencies in MongoDB’s consensus algorithms that
can cause data loss. It ultimately has many similar-
ities with Raft, but diverges in a few ways, mainly
to support other features like chained replication and
unacknowledged writes.
1 Introduction
Databases with built-in replication are ubiquitous.
A short, non-exhaustive list of such databases and
database-like technologies is Cassandra, Couchbase,
CouchDB, FoundationDB, Kafka, Microsoft SQL
Server, MongoDB, Oracle SQL, PostgreSQL, Rab-
bitMQ, Redis, Riak, Zookeeper. Since in many use
cases, replicas are treated as insurance against hard-
ware and software faults, replication must provide
strong, clear, and correct guarantees to the applica-
tion layer. As such, there is a great deal of interest re-
cently in understanding how these technologies work
in theory and in practice.
MongoDB is a NoSQL DBMS with built-in
leader/follower asynchronous replication. Mon-
goDB’s Write Concern API[10] allows clients to
choose from a spectrum of write consistency rang-
ing from entirely unsafe (“unacknowledged”) through
fully consistent (“majority”).
TokuMX1 is a fork of MongoDB with a range of
improvements centered on a different storage engine
based on Fractal Tree indexes R©[1].
MongoDB is known to have problems with its repli-
cation algorithm[6]. In short, the semantics offered
1TokuMX is a fork of MongoDB developed and maintained
by Tokutek, Inc. (http://www.tokutek.com).
by the Write Concern API are not reliably delivered
in the face of network failures, which has contributed
to a widespread sense of distrust in MongoDB.
In TokuMX, we have changed the replication elec-
tion protocol to deliver the semantics of the Write
Concern API in a provably correct way. In particu-
lar, this means that for clients using the “majority”
Write Concern, TokuMX is a proper “CP” system, in
the sense of Brewer’s so-called “CAP Theorem”[2].
As Ark is primarily a modification of the exist-
ing MongoDB consensus algorithm, it’s important to
start with an understanding of that. In Section 2, we
explain the goals and relevant aspects of the existing
replication algorithm in MongoDB 2.6 and TokuMX
1.5. In Section 3, we detail how the current replica-
tion algorithm fails to deliver on the CP promise of
the “majority” Write Concern, and causes two other
related problems.
We describe our changes to the replication algo-
rithm in Section 4, turning it into a new algorithm
called Ark, and in Section 5, we draw parallels to the
Raft paper and its safety and liveness proofs. We dis-
cuss specific implementation choices and tradeoffs in
Section 7.
2 MongoDB replication
In MongoDB/TokuMX, the purpose of replication is
to have multiple machines, or replicas, store the exact
same data. This is leader/follower replication, as op-
posed to multi-master, which means that there should
be a totally ordered sequence of client operations that
is identical on every replica in the set. It is asyn-
chronous, which means that followers pull updates
from the leader and announce their synced position
in the operation history, rather than the leader push-
ing changes to followers and waiting synchronously
for them to respond.
A “replica set” is composed of a leader (“primary”)
and a set of followers (“secondaries”). Replication’s
main goals are to synchronize the data on each mem-
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ber of the set (“replica”), to provide an API for clients
to understand how much their updates have been
replicated through the set, and to automatically fail
over to a new primary if the primary crashes or is
disconnected from the set.
2.1 Synchronization
Synchronization within the replica set is accom-
plished as follows:
One replica in the set is designated as primary, or
the leader. The primary is the only replica that ac-
cepts updates from clients. All other replicas in the
set are secondaries, or followers.
Details of each client update are written to the
“oplog”, a totally ordered sequence of operations
(similar to the binary log in MySQL, can also be
thought of as the replication log). Entries in the oplog
have a position associated with them, that defines the
order of updates. Secondaries maintain an identical
copy of the oplog, and apply modifications in the or-
der they appear in the oplog.
Secondaries cannot be modified by users. The job
of a secondary is to constantly pull data from the pri-
mary’s oplog, save it in its own oplog, and apply the
operations to its copies of the user data collections. A
secondary may serve some client reads from its data
collections, or simply be available to be elected to
primary if failover is necessary.
An important point here: the secondary does not
have to be pulling data directly from the primary.
Any secondary is allowed to pull data from any other
replica in the replica set, as long as the other replica’s
position is ahead of the secondary’s position.
Every two seconds, all replicas exchange informa-
tion with each other, in what is called “heartbeats”.
This information can be arbitrary. The two most im-
portant pieces of information exchanged in the cur-
rent algorithm are the replica’s current oplog position
and the fact that a replica is still up and responding.
One thing that causes a replica to decide it is time
to try to fail over to a new primary is the failure to
receive a heartbeat from the current primary.
2.2 Write Concern
The Write Concern API provides a mechanism by
which clients may block until 0, 1, or more repli-
cas have acknowledged an update. A Write Con-
cern of “majority” blocks until a majority of repli-
cas (bn/2c+ 1, if the replica set contains n replicas)
acknowledge the update.
The purpose of “majority” Write Concern is to
make the replica set fully consistent. Since a node
can only be elected primary by a majority (see Sec-
tion 2.3), if each update is only considered finished
once acknowledged by a majority, any successful elec-
tion must include a replica which was aware of the
acknowledged update, and it will be that replica’s
responsibility to ensure that the update persists.
Clients can use “majority” Write Concern on ev-
ery update, which guarantees that the update will be
persisted even if failover happens immediately after
the update succeeds and reports majority acknowl-
edgement.
Note that false negatives can still occur in this
asynchronous model: an update may be replicated to
a majority of replicas and be safe, but the acknowl-
edgement might fail to return to the client. In Ark,
just as in Raft, we consider this an acceptable failure
mode. Applications that require stronger guarantees
than this should use a system that implements a dis-
tributed atomic commit protocol like 2PC[5, 8], for
example, Apache Zookeeper. Note that the “clients”
in the Raft paper are similar to the database engine
in TokuMX with Ark. In TokuMX, entries are com-
mitted to the oplog in the same transaction as they
are applied to collections (the state machine in Raft),
so the false negatives here do not result in multiple
delivery of oplog messages, rather our false negative
is at the higher database API layer.
We consider “majority” Write Concern to be the
most interesting use case to support, since any weaker
Write Concern expresses the client’s willingness to
suffer data loss in some scenarios. The primary goal
of Ark is to provide correct “majority” Write Con-
cern, but we have also made some choices that make
it more suitable for weaker consistency choices that
are useful in some deployments.
2.3 Failover
Failover is the mechanism by which the replica set
attempts to ensure that there is always exactly one
primary available to serve client updates. If the pri-
mary crashes, is partitioned away from the majority
of replicas by a network failure, or is otherwise un-
responsive, the replica set attempts to select another
replica to step up as primary.
A replica is deemed unreachable if a heartbeat re-
quest fails. At a high level, if the primary becomes
unreachable by other replicas of the replica set, the
other replicas will try to hold an “election”, a process
by which they elect a new primary to start accepting
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user updates. A majority (bn/2c + 1) of replicas in
the replica set are required to elect a new primary.
Note that the election process and the data syn-
chronization process (the threads on a secondary re-
sponsible for picking a replica to copy data from) are
fairly independent. There is a little synchronization
used to determine oplog position, but that is it. Its
possible for a secondary to be replicating oplog data
from a replica that the majority component of repli-
cas thinks is unreachable.
An important component of failover is rollback.
Consider the following scenario:
• Replica A (the primary) receives an update,
which it applies and logs. A network partition
isolates A, a failover happens, and new primary,
B, is elected before that update is replicated.
• B does not have the oplog entry for this update.
In fact, by electing B, all of the replicas that
elected B agreed that the oplog does not contain
this update.
• At some point, when A gets reconnected to the
set, it will see that the current primary B does
not have this update in its oplog, and will “roll-
back”, or undo, the update. This is similar to
the way a leader in Raft forces its followers to
replace log entries that differ from its own.
For simplicity, assume all operations that appear
in the oplog can be reversed.
So, in summary, there are three important concepts
there:
1. Data synchronization.
2. Write acknowledgement.
3. Elections/failover and rollback.
The property we wish to have is the following. If a
client successfully gets an acknowledgement for “ma-
jority” Write Concern for some update, then the user
knows that the update is guaranteed to be in the
replica set going forward, and will not be rolled back.
2.4 TokuMX differences
The replication concepts in TokuMX 1.5 are largely
the same as in MongoDB 2.6. However, there are
a few minor differences that are worth mentioning
before we continue.
2.4.1 GTID
MongoDB’s oplog entries are ordered by a data type
called OpTime, which is the concatenation of a 32-
bit timestamp with second resolution, and a 32-bit
counter that is incremented with each operation, and
reset to 1 each time the timestamp increases.
To support better concurrency, and in anticipa-
tion of some of the changes described in this report,
TokuMX has always used a different data type to or-
der oplog entries, called the GTID. This is a pair of
64-bit integers, 〈term, opid〉, where the opid is incre-
mented each time an operation commits on the pri-
mary, and the term is incremented each time a new
primary is elected, and at this point the opid is re-
set to 0. The GTID is compared lexicographically, so
〈3, 100〉 < 〈3, 101〉 < 〈4, 0〉.
2.4.2 Idempotency
MongoDB’s oplog entries are required to be idempo-
tent. This permits the oplog application to support
at-least-once delivery, but limits the range of opera-
tions that can be expressed in the oplog.
TokuMX’s oplog entries are not required to be
idempotent, therefore the oplog entries must be ap-
plied exactly once on secondaries. Given that the sec-
ondaries are already designed to store exact copies of
the oplog, this is simple to implement by just locally
noting which entries have and have not been applied.
This is functionally equivalent to the suggestion in
Raft that clients assign serial numbers to commands,
and have the state machine avoid re-executing com-
mands.
This removal of the idempotency restriction is to
implement other optimizations in the application of
oplog entries, and is mostly inconsequential to the
problem of consensus. The point of consensus in the
replication system is to copy the oplog perfectly, and
application is effectively orthogonal.
2.5 Failover details
TokuMXs current election/failover protocol, inher-
ited from MongoDB, is as follows. Suppose there is a
network partition such that the primary A is discon-
nected from the replica set. There are two indepen-
dent things that must happen:
1. Another replica B notices that it cannot reach A,
looks at what it knows of the state of the replica
set (via heartbeat messages it has received), and
decides “I think I’ll make a good primary”. B
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then proceeds to elect itself as the set’s new pri-
mary.
2. Independently, A notices that it cannot reach
a majority of the set, and decides to transition
from primary → secondary.
The consequence of this is that A will stop ac-
cepting update operations from clients, because
it is no longer convinced that a majority of repli-
cas will acknowledge those updates.
Once B decides to elect itself, it does so with the
following procedure:
• B broadcasts a message to all other replicas ask-
ing “should I try to elect myself?”. This is known
as a speculative election (this is for heuristic
purposes). With the replies, B learns:
– Whether anyone would veto the election.
If so, B does not try to elect itself.
– Whether any replica has an oplog that is
ahead of B’s oplog.
If so, B does not try to elect itself.
– If B is at the same oplog position as another
potential primary.
If so, it will sleep for a random period of
time between 50 and 1050ms, and then try
the election protocol again. The next time
it tries, it will remember that it just slept
and not sleep again.
The purpose of this step is if two replicas
may both be eligible to become primary, a
random sleep will help ensure that concur-
rent elections are not run.
• If all of the respondents say “yes”, then it pro-
ceeds with the authoritative election. B
broadcasts a message that states “I wish to elect
myself as primary”.
The protocol has begun. When each replica gets
this message, it does the following:
– If there is a reason to veto, then it replies
“veto” (e.g. B’s understanding of the set
membership is stale, or another primary ex-
ists).
A “veto” vote is functionally equivalent to
“no”, in fact the election protocol works
properly if “veto” is interpreted as “no”,
but “veto” is an optimization replicas can
use when they have concrete evidence that
the election should not succeed.
– If the replica participating in the election
has voted “yes” for anyone in the last 30
seconds (in an authoritative election; votes
cast in a speculative election are not con-
sidered), then vote “no”.
A replica may vote “yes” (in an authorita-
tive election) only once every 30 seconds.
– Otherwise, vote “yes”.
The replica doesn’t bother looking at the
oplog’s position before voting yes. This last
fact is strange, but true, which Zardosht
pointed out in https://groups.google.
com/forum/?hl=en-US&fromgroups#
!topic/mongodb-dev/lH3hs8h7NrE.
• If a majority reply to B saying “yes”, and no
replica responds “veto”, then B declares itself as
primary and begins accepting client updates.
If at any point, a primary notices that another pri-
mary exists, it blindly steps down. The hope is to
have another election resolve the dual primary issue.
If A and B are both primary, when they exchange
heartbeats, they will step down.
3 Problems
Briefly, TokuMX and MongoDB currently have the
following problem: a user may successfully get an
acknowledgement for “majority” Write Concern for
some update, and that update may not survive. De-
spite the fact that the update was acknowledged by a
majority of replicas, the update may later roll back.
At a high level, there are three problems with the
election protocol, and they are all loosely related:
1. Updates that succeed with “majority” Write
Concern may roll back. Otherwise known as
“data loss”. This is the big problem mentioned
above.
2. Multiple primaries don’t resolve themselves in an
intelligent way.
3. Letting a replica vote once every 30 seconds can
lead to some long failover times if elections make
it to the second phase and fail.
Now let’s dig into each of these problems a bit
more.
Problem 3.1 Write Concern of “majority” may not
prevent the rollback of updates.
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Before discussing the problems with this protocol,
let’s first say what is not a problem: having A accept
updates (temporarily) after becoming disconnected is
not a problem. When A reconnects with the replica
set, these additional updates will be rolled back. But
this is okay, as long as we haven’t yet guaranteed to
any clients that those updates are safe.
Instead, the problem with this protocol is the fol-
lowing: updates may get an acknowledgement of
“majority” Write Concern (which does mean they’re
safe), and still be rolled back.
Consider the following scenario:
• A network partition happens such that A is dis-
connected from the replica set.
• The rest of the set elects B as primary, but A
has yet to transition to secondary (because that
process is independent of the rest of the replica
set’s election, in fact A may not yet know it has
been disconnected).
• A then reconnects with the replica set, thinking
it is still primary.
• Now we have two primaries, A and B. Also,
recall that all other replicas in the set may be
syncing the oplog from any other replica. They
may all be replicating off A or B.
This is the big problem. An update may repli-
cate off of A or B, and get acknowledged by a
majority of the replica set.
• At best, A and B realize they are both primary,
step down, and allow an election to take place.
In Problem 3.2, we state why it can be worse.
Now we have a problem. Either A or B can win
the new election, and the loser may have some update
that was acknowledged by a majority of the replica
set. This update will then be rolled back, violat-
ing the “majority” Write Concern contract with the
client.
The fundamental flaw in the current replication al-
gorithm that leads to this behavior is that secondaries
blindly acknowledge any update that they can copy,
regardless of whether the update may later rollback.
If a secondary acknowledges an update from A af-
ter having voted B as primary, there is something
wrong. The secondary should know that A’s new up-
dates may be rolled back and therefore must not be
acknowledged.
Problem 3.2 Multiple primaries don’t resolve them-
selves deterministically.
This is related to the first problem. We want mul-
tiple primaries to resolve themselves in a predictable
way because we want to be able to predict which up-
dates will survive and which will be rolled back.
Right now, if two primaries exist, and are made
aware of each other via heartbeats, then they step
down and let another election take care of the prob-
lem. This is problematic for the following reasons:
1. It requires two primaries seeing each other to
resolve the issue. In the right kind of net-
work partition, this may take an indefinitely
long time. See https://jira.mongodb.org/
browse/SERVER-9848.
2. If one primary gets a heartbeat message before it
can send one to the other, that one primary will
step down and the other will not. This makes
“which primary wins” essentially arbitrary. Hav-
ing any decision here be arbitrary is bad, because
it makes the future unpredictable.
Problem 3.3 Elections may take a long time be-
cause a member can vote “yes” at most once every
30 seconds.
MongoDB’s election protocol requires that a mem-
ber may not vote “yes” in more than one election
in any 30-second period. We think this is because
the order of oplog entries is primarily determined by
the timestamp on the primary where they are cre-
ated, so if successful elections happen too frequently,
updates to successive legitimate primaries may end
up getting reordered in the oplog as a result of clock
skew. This would mean that, logically at least, there
would have been multiple concurrent primaries, and
the MongoDB replication system is not equipped to
properly resolve this situation. Limiting elections to
succeed at most once every 30 seconds means that if
the maximum clock skew among replicas is less than
30 seconds, the order of updates done by a single
client will not be changed too much by elections. Up-
dates from one primary may be interspersed with the
successive primary’s updates, but not with the one
after that.
However, this 30 second threshold can be problem-
atic in practice, especially if an election fails: this
necessarily makes the set unavailable for at least 30
seconds, maybe more if successive elections fail.
Part of the problem in this case is that the candi-
date does not do a good job of using the first phase of
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the election process to determine whether the second
phase will succeed. That is bad, because a failed sec-
ond phase can really elongate the downtime during
a failover. Basically, if the first phase can determine
that the second phase will be unsuccessful, it should
do so. Currently, MongoDB and TokuMX have the
following two issues:
1. https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/
SERVER-14382: If a member will vote “no”
in the second phase because it has voted “yes”
for someone else in the last 30 seconds, it should
notify the candidate of this in the first phase.
2. https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/
SERVER-14531: If the candidate gets re-
sponses from less than a majority of replicas
during the first phase, it should not proceed
onto the second (authoritative) phase.
4 Ark Design
At a high level, we want the solution we employ to
have the following characteristics:
• Any update that succeeds with majority Write
Concern cannot be rolled back during a failover.
(Problem 3.1)
• Multiple primaries should resolve themselves in
a predictable way. (Problem 3.2)
• Failover times should be faster. We want to get
rid of this 30 second timer between elections.
(Problem 3.3)
We’ll start by restricting ourselves to the TokuMX
replication algorithm, namely that oplog entries are
identified by and ordered according to the GTID, as
defined in Section 2.4.1 to be 〈term, opid〉.
The key difference between Ark and the standard
MongoDB replication algorithm is the term part of
a GTID. This will be used to demarcate elections and
to provide an association between election terms and
client update operations. This association is criti-
cal for ensuring that updates with “majority” Write
Concern cannot be rolled back.
Below, we will consider an election in a replica set
led by a primary A. In the voting protocol, another
replica B tries to elect itself the new primary.
4.1 Election changes
The first protocol change is to associate the term in
the oplog’s GTID with elections. Each authoritative
election is identified with an electionTermId. Every
replica in the set considers electionTermId to be a
strictly monotonically increasing sequence.
Definition 4.1 (electionTermId) Each authorita-
tive election is identified by an electionTermId that
is selected by the candidate B.
If elected, this replica must use the electionTermId
from its successful election as the term part of the
GTIDs it creates for new oplog entries during its
tenure.
The second protocol change is that each replica
maintains a local value maxV otedTermId, which is
always greater than or equal to the term in any GTID
in its oplog.
Definition 4.2 (maxV otedTermId) A replica’s
maxV otedTermId is the maximum electionTermId
for any election in which it voted “yes”.
A replica’s maxV otedTermId will be used to de-
cide which updates to acknowledge and which elec-
tions to participate in.
During normal operation, this will be identical to
the term part of the GTID for elements being added
to the oplog by the current primary.
4.1.1 Term ID maintenance
These two values are propogated and maintained
through a few different mechanisms:
• In speculative elections, when a replica votes
“yes”, “no”, or “veto”, it includes its
maxV otedTermId along with its ballot.
In the speculative election, the candidate
learns about each other responding replica’s
maxV otedTermId. If the candidate decides to
proceed with an authoritative election, it speci-
fies
electionTermId = max
ballots
maxV otedTermId + 1
and sends this electionTermId along with its au-
thoritative election request to all voters.
• In authoritative elections, when a replica
votes “yes” in an election, it updates
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its maxV otedTermId to the election’s
electionTermId.
Note that this maxV otedTermId is persistent to
disk and survives crashes and process restarts.
4.1.2 Voting changes
When voting in an authoritative elections, each
replica considers the same conditions as in the old
algorithm, except that we eliminate the restriction
against voting “yes” in two elections in the same 30-
second time span, and add a few new conditions:
1. If electionTermId ≤ maxV otedTermId, that
is, the voter has already voted “yes” in
another election with the same or higher
electionTermId, it votes “no”.
This makes sure that each replica may only vote
for one candidate per electionTermId.
2. If the last GTID in the candidate’s oplog is less
than some GTID in the voter’s oplog, the voter
responds with “veto”.
Note that this check was not done in the old algo-
rithm. It is not necessary to veto at this point, a
“no” vote would be sufficient to support “major-
ity” Write Concern properly, but we will discuss
this choice later, in Section 7.
Since a replica only votes “yes” in elections where
electionTermId > maxV otedTermId, and it up-
dates maxV otedTermId when voting “yes”, this es-
tablishes that the sequence of maxV otedTermId val-
ues for each replica in the set is strictly monotonically
increasing.
Additionally, a successful election requires a ma-
jority of “yes” votes, which implies that in every ad-
jacent pair of successful elections there is at least one
“yes” voter in common. Therefore, the replica set’s
total sequence of successful electionTermIds (and
therefore the sequence of terms in GTIDs in the oplog)
is also strictly monotonically increasing.
4.1.3 Election changes’ effects
These changes are enough to solve the problems of
multiple primaries not resolving themselves intelli-
gently (Problem 3.2), and of elections possibly taking
a long time due to the 30 second rule (Problem 3.3).
However, they are not yet enough to prevent the pri-
mary problem that “majority” Write Concern is not
enough to prevent rollback (Problem 3.1).
4.2 Write Concern changes
To solve Problem 3.1, we make one more simple
change: a replica never acknowledges an update from
a primary after it votes “yes” in a later election.
Recall that once a replica votes “yes” in an elec-
tion it updates its maxV otedTermId to that elec-
tion’s electionTermId. The electionTermId must
be greater than any term in the voter’s oplog, or it
would not have voted “yes”.
This establishes a relationship between elections
and Write Concern acknowledgement, through the
GTIDs in the oplog. Namely, if a replica acknowl-
edges an update, it may not vote “yes” for a candidate
that doesn’t have that update, and once a replica has
voted “yes” for a new primary, it will not acknowledge
any more updates from older primaries, so it cannot
acknowledge updates that might later be rolled back
if that election succeeds.
Note that a replica may still copy and apply oplog
entries from any member of the set, knowing that
it may roll them back at any point in the future.
This restriction only affects acknowledgement, and
it is fundamentally a simple rule: a replica may
only acknowledge updates that it thinks will not be
rolled back.
With this, any successful election will cause a ma-
jority of replicas to cease acknowledgement of new
updates to the old primary, which, if the client uses
“majority” Write Concern, means that successful up-
dates must have happened before those replicas voted
for a new primary. Therefore those updates must be
on the newly elected primary, and will not be rolled
back. Updates with a weaker Write Concern may
still be rolled back, but this is a design principle we
accept, in accordance with the Write Concern design.
4.2.1 Primary step-down
This new change introduces a possible problem: after
a failed election, all the replicas that voted “yes” will
be ineligible to satisfy Write Concern from the still-
legitimate primary. Over multiple failed elections,
this could render a majority of the set ineligible to
acknowledge updates, which would halt a system us-
ing “majority” Write Concern (no update could be
satisfactorily acknowledged).
The fix for this is to make the primary more sen-
sitive: each heartbeat message contains a node’s
maxV otedTermId, and when a primary A sees a
heartbeat with maxV otedTermId greater than the
electionTermId for the election in which it was
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elected, the primary immediately steps down. It does
this because it knows that some nodes in the set are
not acknowledging its updates (because they’ve voted
“yes” in a later election). If A should continue as pri-
mary, it may of course re-elect itself immediately, but
it will not continue accepting updates with GTIDs that
may not be acknowledged.
Once an election succeeds, the old primary will be
in one of two cases:
• It may still see a majority of the set, in which
case it will shortly receive a heartbeat containing
a newer maxV otedTermId and step down.
• It may not see a majority of the set, in which
case it will determine that it is out of touch with
the majority component and will step down.
Thus, a deposed primary will necessarily step down
after at most one heartbeat period plus the heartbeat
timeout period (which as of now totals to about 12
seconds, and is configurable).
It is sufficient, to cause an old primary to step
down, to have each replica broadcast only the
maxV otedTermId for elections in which it actually
voted “yes”. However, to speed things up, we add
some optimizations.
Definition 4.3 (maxKnownTermId) A
replica’s maxKnownTermId is the maximum
electionTermId for any election it knows of where
at least one replica voted “yes”.
Because a replica knows about itself,
maxKnownTermId ≥ maxV otedTermId
no matter what.
Every heartbeat carries with it the node’s
maxKnownTermId. If a replica receives a heart-
beat with a higher maxKnownTermId than its own,
it replaces its own with the higher value, and in the
future will broadcast and use that value.
It is an optimization for replicas to rebroadcast
their neighbors’ higher maxKnownTermId value
to attempt to propogate the news of an elec-
tion faster through a partially connected set. A
primary will then step down if it sees a heart-
beat with maxKnownTermId greater than its
electionTermId.
An additional optimization is that, upon success-
ful election, the newly elected primary will ask all
replicas to immediately send a heartbeat broadcast-
ing this news, rather than waiting for the heartbeat
timer to announce it.
4.3 Addressing the problems
Let’s take a moment to look back at the original prob-
lems we introduced in Section 3 and reiterate how
they are addressed.
Problem 4.1 Write Concern of “majority” may not
prevent the rollback of updates.
No single machine will elect two different primaries
with the same electionTermId. Because a major-
ity is needed to elect a primary, any two success-
ful elections must have one voter in common, that
voted “yes” in both elections. Because no replica ever
votes “yes” in two different elections with the same
electionTermId, no two successful elections can have
the same electionTermId.
Each voter that acknowledges an update will not
vote “yes” in an election that will rollback the update.
A majority that acknowledge an update must include
at least one member in the majority that vote “yes”
in a subsequent election. Therefore, if an update is
acknowledged by a majority, it must be on the new
primary and so won’t be rolled back.
For the contrapositive, a replica that votes “yes”
to elect a new primary will stop acknowledging up-
dates from the old primary. Therefore, in a successful
election, a majority of replicas will agree to stop ac-
knowledging updates from the old primary, and this
will ensure that those updates cannot have had “ma-
jority” Write Concern satisfied.
Problem 4.2 Multiple primaries don’t resolve them-
selves deterministically.
Because each elected primary generates GTIDs with
increasing terms, we can predictably get the pri-
mary with the lower electionTermId to step down,
and know which updates were accepted by the de-
posed primary. Because all members communicate
the highest known electionTermId throughout the
set via heartbeats, we are assured that the primary
with the lower electionTermId will eventually step
down, regardless of who it is connected to.
Problem 4.3 Elections may take a long time be-
cause a member can vote “yes” at most once every
30 seconds.
This timer has been removed. Because Ark is ro-
bust enough to handle multiple primaries and resolves
each such case deterministically, we don’t need to
have this 30 second timer.
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That being said, collisions may still occur. We may
have two candidates, B and C, happen very close in
time to each other.
After the first round trip, suppose they both decide
on the same electionTermIdB = electionTermIdC .
Both could run authoritative elections, get a handful
of votes, and neither one could get elected. This is
what Raft would call a “split brain”. In this case,
neither wins, and another election needs to run.
Alternatively, these two elections can hap-
pen with different values of electionTermIdB <
electionTermIdC , and both might succeed in a short
period of time. In that case, B is going to become pri-
mary and then almost immediately step down when
it sees electionTermIdC has been voted on. From
a correctness standpoint, that’s fine, but it could be
confusing for clients to have to switch primaries too
frequently.
These problems exist with the current election pro-
tocol. The symptom in each protocol is different:
• Ark can cause two replicas to be primary in quick
succession, or effectively concurrently for some
clients, due to delayed messages.
• MongoDB’s replication incurs a 30 second freeze
after unsuccessful simultaneous elections.
The root cause of these problems is the same: two
replicas simultaneously try to elect themselves. To
mitigate this, the current MongoDB protocol sleeps
for a random amount of time (50-1050ms) before kick-
ing off an election. This random delay is used in Raft
as well (150-300ms), and is also used for the same
purpose in Ark.
A remaining concern is whether the sleep is suffi-
cient. Is a random sleep of up to one second sufficient
for replica sets that span across data centers and may
have high ping times? Raft experiments with a clus-
ter of 5-9 servers with a broadcast time of 15ms de-
termined the recommended sleep time of 150-300ms.
5 The solution, in Raft’s terms
Raft’s safety and liveness properties follow directly
from five fundamental properties described in Fig-
ure 3 in the Raft paper:
• Election Safety: at most one leader can be
elected in a given term.
• Leader Append-Only: a leader never over-
writes or deletes entries in its log; it only appends
new entries.
• Log Matching: if two logs contain an entry
with the same index and term, then the logs are
identical in all entries up through the given in-
dex.
• Leader Completeness: if a log entry is com-
mitted in a given term, then that entry will be
present in the logs of the leaders for all higher-
numbered terms.
• State Machine Safety: if a server has applied
a log entry at a given index to its state machine,
no other server will ever apply a different log
entry for the same index.
Election Safety is provided by the addition and
treatment of the electionTermId. Since each replica
can only vote “yes” once for each electionTermId,
this ensures that in each electionTermId at most one
leader may be elected.
Leader Append-Only is an existing property of
the oplog and how the GTID is defined.
Log Matching is a consequence of rollback.
Whenever a replica attempts to sync from another, it
asserts the Log Matching property, and if the source
replica’s log doesn’t contain its oplog as a prefix, the
syncing replica rolls back operations until its oplog
matches a prefix of the source’s oplog. Only after
this point may it proceed and copy new entries. Mul-
tiple concurrent primaries’ oplogs may diverge at the
end (and their followers’ oplogs would as well), but
these entries would have different terms and therefore
would not invalidate the Log Matching property.
Leader Completeness is ensured only for up-
dates acknowledged with “majority” Write Concern.
But according to the refusal of replicas to acknowl-
edge updates after voting for a new primary, Leader
Completeness is ensured for these updates.
State Machine Safety makes sense if we con-
sider the long-term state of the replica set. In Mon-
goDB/TokuMX, the state machine refers to the user
data collections. Since updates are applied separately
from their Write Concern acknowledgement, there
may be a period of time when an update is reflected
in the state machine of some replicas, before the oper-
ation rolls back. In this case, the operation’s “index”
within the log will eventually be taken by a different
operation, which would at this point be applied on
other replicas.
This complexity is due to the asynchronous nature
of replication in MongoDB/TokuMX, essentially that
application may happen before replication and then
the operation would be rolled back. However, once a
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replica establishes contact with another replica and
decides to roll back an operation (in Raft, this would
be when a leader forces its followers to replace log
entries with its own), that operation is rolled back
before any new operations are synced and applied,
which maintains logical separation of the rolled back
operation and the legitimately applied operations.
We needed to tweak the definitions of a few of
Raft’s fundamental properties, but not in ways incon-
sistent with an asynchronous interpretation of Raft,
nor in ways that invalidate its safety and liveness
proofs. We leave the translation of Raft’s safety and
liveness arguments to our asynchronous context as a
straightforward but exciting exercise for the reader.
6 Conclusions
We have presented Ark, a new consensus algorithm
based on and supporting the existing MongoDB
replication algorithm and semantics, with minimal
changes. Ark is inspired by Raft and provably pro-
vides safety and liveness according to the same argu-
ments as Raft.
Ark has many of the same understandability prop-
erties of Raft. The oplog in Ark does not permit
holes anywhere in an agreed-upon prefix which lim-
its the ways in which replicas can diverge from each
other. By virtue of the MongoDB replication archi-
tecture, Ark decouples the mechanisms of replication
and elections, and brings them together just enough
to provide safety.
In contrast with Raft, Ark implements an asyn-
chronous, pull-based replication model. This sup-
ports a wider range of client semantics that allows
application developers to choose points along a trade-
off between safety and latency. In addition, Ark
supports different replication topologies like chained
replication and multi-data center replication with
more flexibility than Raft does with its synchronous
push model.
While Ark is an implementation of a consensus pro-
tocol that works in a real database system, it is also
evidence of the flexibility in the Raft consensus al-
gorithm. It was relatively straightforward to tweak
Raft in safe ways to make it fit the MongoDB archi-
tecture and programming model, and we think this
is an important feature of Raft.
7 Future work
We still have some things to think about. The ba-
sics of Ark are correct, but it’s possible there is some
tweaking to be done to improve the user experience.
Likely, most of the below questions can be answered
with experiments and user feedback.
Question 7.1 Should we veto based on the oplog
contents?
In an authoritative election, if the GTID of the can-
didate B’s last oplog entry is less than the GTID of
the voter’s, we currently veto.
We could theoretically vote “no” and and still have
“majority” Write Concern work properly. This is a
user experience question and not a correctness ques-
tion. Here are reasons why we do this:
• This should happen in rare circumstances, be-
cause speculative election does this check and
does not proceed if it fails.
• Users don’t just run with “majority” Write Con-
cern. They run with other custom Write Con-
cerns to give them different assurances.
Consider a replica set spread across three data
centers, called DC1, DC2, and DC3. Suppose
each data center has three members of the replica
set, so the entire replica set is nine members.
Users may set a custom Write Concern that
means “make sure my update has made it to at
least one other data center”.
The idea is that the user is assuming either all
members in a data center remain up or none do,
and that the probability of two data centers be-
ing down is negligible. Now, suppose the primary
is in DC1 and DC1 goes down. In this case, if
the update only made it to one replica in DC2,
and that replica just votes “no” in the authori-
tative election, then the update got the proper
acknowledgement but may be rolled back, be-
cause the 5 other members that don’t have this
update may elect a different primary. But with
veto power, the update will not be rolled back,
because the one replica in that did receive the
update won’t let a primary be elected without
the update.
Essentially, this choice to allow replicas to veto
based on the contents of the oplog lends more con-
sistency to updates that use weaker Write Concern
settings, which seems to be a valuable property for
many MongoDB applications.
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Question 7.2 Should there be some timer so mem-
bers cannot vote as often as they do?
30 seconds is too long, but should there be some-
thing like 1 second? To help prevent multiple pri-
maries being elected simultaneously?
In the Raft paper, they spend some time talking
about the election timeout, but in Raft this is the
window of time an election stays open to hear votes.
It is not particularly related to the number of elec-
tions a given node can participate in in a given time
slice (apart from this timeout divided by the number
of replicas).
This timer also seems to be valuable in ensuring
that the primary doesn’t move too quickly around
the set for a client to follow.
Question 7.3 Is the random sleep of about 1 second
before starting an election sufficient to keep two com-
peting elections from happening at roughly the same
time too often?
The sleep time should not be too long, but the
range should be significantly longer than the range of
typical message delays in the cluster.
Should cross-data center replica sets do something
different? One idea is to pick the sleep time based on
ping times we see in heartbeats.
Question 7.4 Should we make heartbeats more so-
phisticated?
Currently, all members heartbeat all other mem-
bers every 2 seconds regardless of role or topology.
Heartbeat traffic is one of the things that limits a
replica set’s size, and for XDCR this could be more
traffic across the WAN than we’d like.
Perhaps each node could heartbeat what it thinks
is the primary once a second, and all other members
every 5 seconds? This could improve failover time
by causing members to notice a down primary faster,
and reduce the overall heartbeat traffic in the cluster.
Another option is to send heartbeats along a
different topology than a complete graph. Other
systems[3, 4, 9] use rings, trees, or other incomplete
graphs to propogate the same information being ex-
changed here with heartbeats.
Question 7.5 How should we handle dynamic clus-
ter membership?
Raft has an elegant solution to dynamic member-
ship: membership changes are recorded in the log
stream, and the cluster uses an intermediate stage
where replicas are aware of both configurations tem-
porarily, until they have agreed on the new configu-
ration.
MongoDB’s existing configuration management
is currently stored outside of the log, and the
in-memory representation of configuration is not
well suited to maintaining the intermediate dual-
configuration state used by Raft. It is still an open
question as to the right way to adapt a safe dynamic
membership protocol to the existing MongoDB archi-
tecture.
Storing configuration changes in the log seems
fairly straightforward and appropriate, but manag-
ing the dual-configuration state properly seems like a
challenge.
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